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ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY OVERSTATING
GOODWIN LEASE'S VALUE, INCLUDING IT AS MARITAL
PROPERTY, AND AWARDING IT TO DEFENDANT•
As demonstrated in the Brief of Appellant ("Brief"),

Judge Eves abused his discretion by overstating the value, if
any, of the Goodwin Lease, by including it among the marital
assets and by using its inflated value to dramatically distort
the equitable division of martial property.
A.

The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion By
Overstating the Value of the Goodwin Lease,

In his Brief, Defendant/Appellant marshalled the
evidence to show that Plaintiff/Appellee testified that the
Goodwin Lease was valued at $244,100.
1025-26.)

(Brief at 4, 13; R. at

She later testified that farming the Goodwin property

was not profitable.

(R. at 1181-1183.)

Clifford Cook, an individual who farmed the Goodwin
property for 20 years before the Davies, testified that he never
realized a profit and considered farming it to be an "expensive
hobby."

(R. at 1403.)

Judge Eves later observed that based on

the evidence presented at trial, it appeared as if the Davies'
farming activities were producing nothing more than tremendous
expenses every year.

(R. at 1190-92.)

Defendant/Appellant argued that considering the
property's unprofitability, the Goodwin Lease was essentially
worthless.

(Brief at 12-15; R. at 1182, 1301, 1306, 1403-04.)

At least one point during the trial, Judge Eves appeared to
believe the same.

(R. at 1190-92.)

Furthermore, any future

income to Defendant/Appellant from farming activities would be
1

conditioned on Defendant/Appellant's own hard labor--which does
not qualify as a marital asset.

(Brief at 14.)

See Erickson v.

Wasatch Manor, Inc., 802 P.2d 1314, 1323 (Utah App. 1990) (noting
that future income conditioned on personal services is not a
marital interest).
The trial court received no expert testimony or
appraisals regarding the value of the land subject to the Goodwin
Lease.

On its face, the Goodwin Lease covers 277 acres of
(R. at 242DY.)1

property.

Judge Eves invented his own formula for the purpose of
valuing the Goodwin Lease: "$3,000 per year times 30 years, which
equal a total current value of $90,000."
699.)

(Brief at 4, 11; R. at

Such formula is not supported by the record on appeal, is

not consistent with Utah law and is not within the trial court's
discretion.

(Brief at 10-15.)

Plaintiff/Appellee, in violation of Rule 11, Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure, referenced an accounting text and formula
not used at trial in an effort to justify Judge Eves' valuation.
Such accounting text and formula should be stricken, pursuant to
the Court's Order dated October 11, 1996, because they are not
part of the record on appeal and were clearly not used by Judge
Eves in reaching his $90,000 valuation of the Goodwin Lease.
at 699.)

(R.

Even when applying her accounting formula,

Plaintiff/Appellee incorporates Judge Eves' error of using 3 0

1

It is noteworthy that references in the
Plaintiff/Appellee's Brief asserting that the Goodwin Lease
covered a larger tract of land were not supported by the record
and were therefore stricken pursuant to an Order by this Court on
October 10, 1996.
2

years as the remaining term on the Goodwin Lease.

(Brief at 11

n.4. )
As indicated in the Brief, Judge Eves abused his
discretion with regards to the Goodwin Farm in several respects,
including the following:

(1) by overvaluing the Goodwin Lease;

(2) by using a faulty formula; (3) by not discounting the amount
to its present value; (4) by not including sufficiently detailed
financial findings as required by Utah law; (5) by not obtaining
an expert appraisal on the property; (6) by not considering the
Lease's extensive restrictions and invalidations; (7) by placing
a value on Defendant/Appellant's future personal services; and
(8) by not properly weighing the testimony from all relevant
witnesses, including Plaintiff/Appellee, that farming operations
on the Goodwin Farm had proven unprofitable and amounted to
nothing more than an "expensive hobby."

(Brief at 9-15.)

At two points in the trial, in fact, Judge Eves
indicated that he agreed that farming the Goodwin property
constituted an "expensive hobby." (R. at 1402-1404.)

At one

point, Judge Eves stated:
I guess the point that I am making is this.
If we look at these figures, it looks to me
like your desire to farm is an expensive
hobby that isn't producing any income. What
it does is produce tremendous expenses every
year, and you're slowly but surely digging
yourself a big hole. And if that's the
situation, Craig may be in the same
circumstance, and, in fact, his farming
operation may not have any value either.
That's the -- that's the -- what's to be
drawn from these figures that you're
presenting is that your losing money every
year from your farming operations. So that's
why I asked.

3

(Emphasis added.)

(R. at 1190-92.)

Judge Eves noted that

Plaintiff/Appellee's figures showed that the parties were losing
money every year on their farming activities.

Plaintiff/Appellee

did not present other figures to contradict such conclusion.
Defendant/Appellant maintains in this appeal that Judge Eves
abused his discretion by disregarding such figures and inventing
his own formula instead.
B.

The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion By Including
the Goodwin Lease as Marital Property,

In addition to grossly overvaluing the Goodwin Lease,
Defendant/Appellant maintains that Judge Eves abused his
discretion through his inconsistent application of the "sweat
equity" doctrine.

Plaintiff/Appellee testified that she

contributed a significant amount of time and effort to the
maintenance, repairs and upkeep of both the Cow Hollow and
Goodwin properties.

(R. at 907-16, 973-84.)

Judge Eves found

that Plaintiff/Appellee's labors, maintenance and repairs on Cow
Hollow were merely consistent with the "family use of the
property," (Brief at 9; R. at 688-89), while her labors on the
Goodwin Farm constituted "sweat equity" which converted the
Goodwin Lease to a marital asset.

(Brief at 8-9; R. at 1559.)

While recognizing that Utah law provides a "sweat
equity" exception for donee property, Defendant/Appellant
maintains that Judge Eves' position on the Goodwin Lease is
arbitrary, inconsistent and in contradiction of his position on
the Cow Hollow property.

4

C.

The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion By Awarding
Defendant/Appellant the Majority of the Marital
Debt Offset Against the Overvalued Goodwin Lease»

By overvaluing the Goodwin Lease and classifying it as
a marital asset awarded to Defendant/Appellant, Judge Eves has
grossly distorted the fair and equitable distribution of the
marital property.

Plaintiff/Appellee argues in her brief that

Utah law does not require a precisely equal division of property.
While this may be true, the general rule is that marital property
should be shared equally between the parties, unless the trial
court memorializes adequate findings of unusual circumstances.
Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1022 (Utah App. 1990).

(Brief at 9-11.)

Judge Eves, rather than memorializing unusual findings which
justified the grossly disparate distribution of debts and assets
absent the inflated value of the Goodwin Lease, found that "the
division of debt appears appropriate" "in view of the fact that
Defendant received a higher value of the marital property."

(R.

at 806-807.)
The "higher value of marital property" awarded to
Defendant/Appellant consists primarily of the disputed Goodwin
Lease--since the value of the Lease comprised over 61 percent2
of the marital property awarded to Defendant/Appellant.
801-02.)

(R. at

Were it not for the Judge Eves' overvaluation of the

Goodwin Lease, Plaintiff/Appellee likely would have been awarded
substantially more of the marital debt and Defendant/Appellant

2

Defendant/Appellant was awarded $147,069 in marital
property. (R. at 801-02). The trial court valued the Goodwin
Lease at $90,000. (R. at 799-00). $90,000 divided by $147,069
equals 61 percent.
5

would likely have been awarded more of the "genuine" marital
assets.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY IMPUTING MORE
INCOME TO DEFENDANT/APPELLANT THAN HE EARNED IN FOUR
YEARS PRECEDING THE DIVORCE.
Judge Eves abuse his discretion by imputing a monthly

income to Defendant/Appellant that was substantially higher than
he earned in the four years immediately preceding the divorce
decree.

(R. at 751.)

While reviewing the couples' joint tax

information from 1991 through 1994, Plaintiff/Appellee testified
that Defendant/Appellant earned substantially less than $1,500
per month.

(Brief at 15-17/ R. at 1058-63.)

Judge Eves'

imputation of income was not in accordance with Utah law.
Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5 (7) (a) (Supp. 1995).

Utah

(Brief at 15.)

In her brief, Plaintiff/Appellee argues that Judge
Eves' imputation was appropriate because the record supported the
conclusion that Defendant/Appellant was earning more than $2,540
per month.

However, Plaintiff/Appellee completely disregarded or

misunderstood the difference between gross income and net income.
Plaintiff/Appellee's argument completely ignored the "tremendous
expenses involve in the farming operations that caused the
parties to lose money every year.

(R. at 1191.)

For instance, a farmer expends labor, the cost of the
seed, water, ground, equipment, etc. in order to grow hay.

If he

then feeds that hay to his animals, the farmer does not realize
income from his hay.

Rather, a farmer recognizes "expenses" of

his farm operations.

Testimony at trial proved that the

"expenses" of the Goodwin farm operations typically exceeded its

6

revenues.

(R. at 1191.)

Even Judge Eves acknowledged this fact.

(R. at 1190-92.)
While ignoring or misunderstanding this concept,
Plaintiff/Appellee's brief lists every aspect of
Defendant/Appellant's farming operation as "income," without any
consideration for the correlating expenses.

Thus,

Plaintiff/Appellee's conclusion that Defendant/Appellant was
earning in excess of $2,540 per month is false, misleading,
without merit and therefore should be stricken.

If Judge Eves'

ruling is allowed to stand, then trial judge's in future Utah
divorce actions will be permitted to impute whatever income a
disgruntled spouse feels that her ex-husband is capable of
earning.

Such a policy is plainly wrong and therefore should be

avoided.
Most individuals in this state could earn more money by
working harder through overtime, second jobs, career changes,
etc.

In fact, many public servants could earn a lot more income

if they were to work in the private sector.

Some elementary

school teachers may even earn more money if they left teaching
and became garbage collectors.

However, public policy dictates

that we do not require parties in divorce to leave their
professions of choice and find higher paying jobs.
chose to be a farmer.

Craig Davie

It may be possible that he could have

earned more money in another profession--but such is not the
issue.

If every farmer in this country were to give up farming

to find other work, what kind of society would remain?
Judge Eves' finding that Defendant/Appellant was
"capable" of earning more than the evidence revealed at trial was
7

an abuse of discretion, and his subsequent imputation of a $1,500
monthly income for the purpose of calculating child support was
clearly erroneous.3
III. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY IMPROPERLY
RESTRICTING DEFENDANT/APPELLANT'S VISITATION RIGHTS.
It is amusing how much emphasis Plaintiff/Appellee's
counsel places on Defendant/Appellant's alleged fornication or
adultery when the record clearly reflects Plaintiff/Appellee's
own out-of-wedlock sexual relationship with her "friend," Glade.
(R. at 1422-23.)
Judge Eves, however, made no findings or conclusions
regarding either party's morals.

Instead, Judge Eves made an

explicit finding that both "Sheb and Seth have expressed
discomfort with visiting overnight when their father is
entertaining Ms. McFall overnight."

(R. at 685-86, 749-50.)

Plaintiff/Appellee has not disputed the fact that the record does
not support such a finding.

(Brief at 17-19.)

Due to the lack

of sufficiency of evidence, such finding should be set aside
pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52(a) .
IV.

DEFENDANT/APPELLANT'S BRIEF AND APPEAL ARE IN
COMPLIANCE WITH UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE.
In her brief, Plaintiff/Appellee makes several attacks

concerning the adequacy of Defendant/Appellant's Brief and the
effectiveness of this appeal, all of which are without merit.4
3

It is noteworthy that any and all references in
Plaintiff/Appellee's Brief to Defendant/Appellant's post-divorce
income were ordered stricken by this Court in an Order dated
October 10, 1996.
4

It is noteworthy that Plaintiff/Appellee's motion of
suggestion of mootness was denied by this Court in an Order dated
October 10, 1996.
8

Defendant/Appellant's appeal and Brief are in full compliance
with the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
A.

Defendant/Appellant' a Brief Complies With The
Requirement Of Marshalling The Evidence.

Defendant/Appellant has adequately met his requirement
to marshall the evidence through his statement of the case and
his argument with numerous cites to the record on appeal.
Specifically, Defendant/Appellant marshalled the evidence for
each issue on appeal: (1) the valuation of the Goodwin Lease as a
marital asset; (2) the court's imputing a $1500 monthly income to
Defendant/Appellant for the purpose of determining child support;
and (3) the restrictions placed on Defendant/Appellant's
overnight visitations with his sons.
1.

Evidence Regarding the Goodwin Lease Was
Adequately Marshalled.

First, with regard to the valuation of the Goodwin
Lease as a marital asset, Plaintiff/Appellant's Brief marshalled
the following evidence:

(1) the terms and restrictions of the

Goodwin Lease, (Brief at 3-4; R. at 292DY-EC); (2)
Plaintiff/Appellee's testimony regarding the terms and value of
the Goodwin Lease, (Brief at 3-4, 11; R. at 1110-15, 1024-26);
(3) Judge Eves' finding regarding the labors, maintenance and
repairs of Plaintiff/Appellee constituting sweat equity, (Brief
at 4, 8; R. at 801, 1559); (4) Clifford Cook's testimony
regarding the unprofitability of the Goodwin property, (Brief at
3; R. at 1403-04); (5) Judge Eves' formula and calculation for
valuation of the Lease, (Brief at 4, 11 n.4; R. at 699); (6)
Plaintiff's labors, repairs and maintenance on Cow Hollow, (Brief

9

at 8-10; R. at 688-89); (7) Judge Eves' division of marital debts
and assets, (Brief at 4-5; R. at 787, 803, 1313.)
Defendant/Appellant's argument centered around the
valuation formula and the finding that Plaintiff's labors on Cow
Hollow were consistent with the family use on the property, while
her labors on Goodwin converted the property to a marital asset.
Utah courts require only that an appellant marshall relevant
evidence, which plaintiff/Appellant has done. Slatterv v. Covey &
Co.. Inc., 857 P.2d 243, 246 (Utah App. 1993).

Furthermore, Utah

courts do not require an appellant to marshall evidence in
situations where, as in the instant case, the court's findings
are insufficiently detailed.
638 (Utah App. 1995).

Campbell v. Campbell, 896 P.2d 635,

Lastly, to the extent that an appellant

fails to adequately marshall the evidence in her first brief, she
can do so in her reply brief.

State v. Sherard, 818 P.2d 554,

561 (Utah App. 1991).
In short, the record does not even contain a scintilla
of competent evidence to support Judge Eves' formula for valuing
the Goodwin Lease.

The record does contain an extensive account

of Plaintiff/Appellant's considerable labors on the Goodwin farm,
(R. at 910-18, 968-83, 1111-41, 1173-76), but Judge Eves made no
findings or conclusions which justify the disparity of treatment
between the "family use" labors on the Cow Hollow property and
the labors Plaintiff/Appellant performed on the Goodwin (R. at
1080-94.)

Defendant/Appellant maintains that Plaintiff/

Appellee's labors on Goodwin were also consistent with the
"family use" of the property.

(Brief at 7-9.)

Thus, Judge Eves'

conclusions of law regarding the Goodwin Farm are incorrect and
10

should be overturned since such conclusions are accorded no
particular deference on appeal. Slatterv v. Covey & Co., Inc.,
857 P.2d 243, 246 (Utah App. 1993).
2.

Evidence Regarding Defendant/Appellant's
Income Was Adequately Marshalled.

Second, with respect to the court's imputing a $1500
monthly income to Defendant/Appellant for the purpose of
determining child support, Defendant/Appellant marshalled the
evidence regarding Plaintiff/Appellee's testimony with respect to
his income during the marriage. (Brief at 5, 15-16; R. at 752,
1059-63. )
As was the case with the formula used in valuing the
Goodwin Lease, Defendant/Appellant's requirement to marshall the
evidence supporting Mr. Davie's imputation of income was not an
overly burdensome task because the record contains absolutely no
support for such a finding.

See Slatterv, 857 P.2d at 246

(requiring only the marshalling of relevant evidence).

Both the

valuation of the Goodwin Lease and the imputation of income to
Mr. Davie involve mathematical numbers that are strictly
traceable to specific portions of the record on appeal.
Defendant/Appellant provided the Court with specific cites to
such figures, formulas and calculations in his Brief and
accordingly satisfied the marshalling of the evidence
requirement.
Plaintiff/Appellee argues in her brief that, in her
opinion, Defendant/Appellant is capable of earning $1500 per
month--even though he never did during their marriage.
1063.)

(R. at

It is interesting that Plaintiff/Appellee spends a
11

considerable amount of time at trial testifying that her husband
was a lousy and lazy farmer, but seems to believe that he can
almost double his income overnight after the divorce--and after
he lost the Kirk/13 Mile farm to her in the divorce.
Judge Eves abused his discretion by relying on
Plaintiff/Appellee's opinion testimony that her ex-husband was
capable of earning $1500 per month.

(R. at 1059-63.)

Outside of

Plaintiff/Appellee's bald assertion, there was no other evidence
introduced at trial or considered by Judge Eves which indicated
that Defendant/Appellant ever earned $1,500 per month.
Plaintiff/Appellee readily admitted during cross-examination that
her $1,500 figure was merely her estimation and imputation of
what she felt that he was "capable" of earning.

(R. at 1059-60.)

Judge Eves adopted Plaintiff/Appellee's $1,500 monthly income
figure into his findings of fact and conclusions of law without
any measure of scrutiny.

(R. at 295-96, 751.)

To the extent

that Judge Eves relied on Plaintiff/Appellee's bald assertion
regarding ex-husband's income capabilities to impute a specific
income to Mr. Davie, he abused his discretion.

Since there is no

other evidence in the record on appeal to justify a $1,500
monthly income for Defendant/Appellant, this Court should
overturn the trial court's findings as being clearly erroneous.
3.

Appellant Appropriately Marshalled Evidence
Regarding Visitation Restrictions,

Third, with respect to the trial court's restrictions
on Defendant/Appellant's overnight visitations with his sons,
Defendant/Appellant appropriately marshalled the relevant
evidence.

(Brief at 5, 17-19; R. at 685, 782-83, 1415-17, 1495,
12

1502.)

Due to Judge Eves specific findings that the boys "have

expressed discomfort with visiting overnight," (R. at 685), the
only relevant evidence necessary to challenge such a finding is
the testimony of the boys.

Defendant/Appellant's Brief showed

that neither Sheb or Seth ever made any such statement.

Judge

Eves abused his discretion by mischaracterizing their testimony
in attempt to justify his denying Mr. Davie the right to
reasonable visitation rights with his teenage sons.

Thus, Judge

Eves' finding that the boys expressed discomfort with overnight
visitation is against the clear weight of evidence making such a
finding clearly erroneous.
B.

Defendant/Appellant's Notice of Appeal Is In
Compliance With The Utah Rules Of Appellate
Procedure

Plaintiff/Appellee argues in her brief that this appeal
must be dismissed because Defendant/Appellant failed to reference
the trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in his
Notice of Appeal.

Such argument is completely without merit and

is unsupported with any case law.
Rule 3(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, provides
that appeals may be taken "from all final judgments and orders."
The Rules do not require an appellant to appeal from specific
findings or conclusions.

See Rule 3(d), Utah Rules of Appellate

Procedure; Form 1, Notice of Appeal, Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.

Several Utah cases show that a divorce decree is the

very type of "final judgment or order" referred to in Rule 3.
Kessimakis v. Kessimakis, 546 P.2d 888 (Utah 1976) (holding that
an appeal had to be taken within one month of the divorce decree,

13

even though such decree did not become a final judgment until
three months after its entry).
In fact, there are numerous reported Utah cases in
which appeal is taken on underlying issues from the decree of
divorce.

Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1, 2 (Utah App. 1992);

Allred v. Allred, 835 P.2d 974, 975-76 (Utah App. 1992); Noble v.
Noble, 761 P.2d 1369, 1371 (Utah 1988); Beals v. Beals, 682 P.2d
862, 863 (Utah 1984) .
Furthermore, when appealing from an entire final
judgment, it is not necessary to specify each and every order and
detail from which the appellant seeks review.

Scudder v.

Kennecott Copper Corp., 886 P.2d 48 (Utah 1994).

Hence,

Defendant/Appellant's Notice of Appeal was in full compliance
with the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
C,

The "Benefits of the Judgment" Argument Raised in
Brief of Appellee Is Not Applicable In A Divorce
Context.

Contrary to Plaintiff/Appellant's brief, the "benefits
of the judgment" argument does not apply in a divorce context.
Applying the rule in a divorce context would prove disastrous and
against public policy because parties would be forced to abandon
their personal property in order to appeal a divorce decree.
There are no reported cases in Utah in which a court
has applied the so-called "benefits of the judgment" rule to a
divorce case.

Were such a rule to be applied in a divorce

context, most if not all parties to a divorce would be precluded
from appealing.
Furthermore, Defendant/Appellant maintains that he
received no "benefit" from the divorce decree.
14

He was awarded a

substantially high portion of the joint marital debt, and a gift
lease from his mother was the only significant marital asset
awarded to him.

The "benefits" listed in Plaintiff/Appellee's

brief are nothing more than income from farm property owned by
Mr. Davie--to argue that Mr. Davie must refrain from his farming
occupation pending the outcome of this appeal is utter nonsense.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing points and authorities,
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial
court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of
Divorce.
DATED this

^

day of November, 1996.
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